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Sentencing: Disparity, Inconsistency, and a
New Federal Criminal Code
In 1966, Congress established a National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws.' The duties of the Commission in reforming Title 18 were
set forth as follows:
The Commission shall make a full and complete review and study
of the statutory and case law of the United States which constitutes
the federal system of criminal justice for the purpose of formulating
and recommending to the Congress legislation which would im-
prove the federal system of criminal justice .... 2
Although the Commission concentrated on several problem areas within
Title 18,3 this article will examine only the Commission's recommendations
to improve the imprisonment provisions of the federal sentencing system.
Congress felt a particular need for reform of federal sentencing procedures.
This can be seen through its directive that the Commission
. . . make recommendations for revision and recodification of the
criminal laws of the United States, including . . . such changes
in the penalty structure as the Commission may feel will better
serve the ends of justice.4
The Commission has pinpointed three major shortcomings in the federal
sentencing system: (1) mandatory sentences, 5 (2) inconsistent penalty pro-
visions,6 and (3) disparity in sentencing. 7 The problem of mandatory sen-
tences, i.e., statutory provisions fixing minimum prison terms without the op-
portunity for probation or parole, shall not be considered here since it is only
rarely found in federal statutes and generally limited to federal narcotics
1. Act of Nov. 8 , 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of
July 8, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44.
2. Id. § 3.
3. For example, the proposed code will be more comprehensive, better integrated,
and suggestive of a more restrained approach as to what constitutes federal criminal
jurisdiction. FORWARD TO FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS at xi (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED NEW FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL CODE].
4. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. §§ 1516, as amended, Act of
July 8, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44 (emphasis added).
5. WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIM-
INAL LAWS, Vol. II, at 1251 (1970) [hereinafter cited at WORKINO PAPERS].
6. Id. at 1246.
7. Id. at 1255.
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laws." In addition, statutory language included in the Commission's pro-
posed new Federal Criminal Code appears to solve the problem simply by
allowing indefinite sentences, probation, and parole in all federal convic-
tions.9
Inconsistency In Penalty Provisions
Inconsistency in penalty provisions has been one of the foremost problems of
our sentencing system. For example, a person convicted of making a "false,
fictitious, or fraudulent" claim against a government department or agency
subjects himself to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, 10 while a
person convicted of a similar false claim in excess of $100 against the Post
Office Department is subjected only to one year imprisonment and a $500
fine." The existence of this disparity leads arguably to unequal treatment
of some criminals. Prison discipline likewise is affected when inmates dis-
cover that their sentences are harsher than those of prisoners convicted of
more serious offenses.12
The principal factor leading to inconsistent penalty provisions is the "piece-
meal" approach to the treatment of criminal issues. Title 18, like most state
penal codes, was enacted on a "piecemeal" basis by "numerous differently
composed legislatures"' 3 with their own view as to what sentence best fits
the crime. Professor Herbert Wechsler has bitterly criticized this "piece-
meal" approach.
No branch of penal legislation is, in my view, more unprincipled or
more anarchical than that which deals with prison terms that may
or sometimes must be imposed on conviction of specific crimes.
The legislature typically makes determinations of this order not on
any systematic basis but rather by according its ad hoc attention to
some discrete area of criminality in which there is a current hue and
cry. Distinctions are thus drawn which do not have the slightest
bearing on the relative harmfulness of conduct and the consequent
importance of preventing it so far as possible, on the probable
8. Id. at 1252.
9. PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing sections:
§ 3201(2)-A sentence of imprisonment of more than six months shall be an
indefinite sentence.
§ 3101(1)-[a] person who has been convicted of a federal offense may be
sentenced to probation or unconditional discharge ...
§ 3401(1)-[elvery prisoner sentenced to an indefinite term of imprison-
ment shall be eligible for release on parole upon completion of the service
of any minimum term, or, if there is no minimum, at any time.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1964).
11. Id. § 288 (1964).
12. WORKiNG PAPERS at 1246.
13. Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 1134, 1138 (1960).
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dangerousness of the individual whose conduct is involved, or
even on a public demand for heavy sanctions which is so inexor-
able that it cannot safely be denied. What dictates legislation is the
simple point of politics that reelection demands voting against sin,
whenever ballots on the question must be cast.
14
Congressman Celler has voiced a similar but more reserved criticism:
The penalties imposed at other times and places have reflected the
cultural preferences and exigencies of the era rather than any
real attempt to weigh the value of the methods in use.15
It appears that a primary cause of sentence inconsistency is the enactment
of criminal statutes with little consideration of what sentences are currently
authorized for equally grave crimes.' Thus, a congressional committee
considering what maximum sentence to fix for robbery of a post office, for
example, should consider initially the present penalty for robbery of other
federal buildings.
As a result of this "piecemeal" approach, there are a large and irrational
number of federal sentencing categories.17 Title 18 contains some 55 distinct
punishment categories. Among these categories are 18 separate and dis-
tinct maximum prison terms ranging from 30 days to life imprisonment and
death,' 14 different fine levels ranging from $50 to $25,000,'9 and various
combinations of other prison terms and fines. Such numerous sentencing dis-
tinctions are clearly "in excess of those which could rationally be drawn on
the basis of relative harmfulness of conduct or the probable dangerousness
of the offenders. '20  Consequently, the Commission has recommended that
Congress place criminal sentences within a few broad categories relating to
the seriousness of the crime.
The Proposed Code
The Commission has recommended establishing six categories of federal of-
fenses.2' Arguably, such categorization would
14. Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 465, 472-73 (1961).
15. Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 243 (1960) (remarks of Rep.
Celler).
16. See note 13 supra at 1139.
17. Id. at 1250.
18. 30 days, 90 days, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years,
6 years, 7 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years, 25 years, 30 years, life, and death.
WORKING PAPERS at 1250.
19. $50, $100, $150, $200, $250, $300, $500, $1,000, $2,000, $3,000, $5,000,
$10,000, $20,000, and $25,000. Id.
20. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 15 (1967), [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS].
21. PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3002.
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achieve a sense of order, and yet,. at the same time, permit legis-
lative grading of offenses of different levels of severity within
controlled limitations.
22
Specifically, Section 3002 of the proposed code establishes the following cate-
gories: Class A, B and C felonies, Class A and B misdemeanors, and infrac-
tions. As might be expected, the Class A felony includes the most serious
offenses such as intentional murder and forcible rape while the infraction
category includes minor offenses such as speeding violations. Authorized
prison terms for each category are as follows:
Class A felony - no more than 30 years
Class B felony - no more than 15 years
Class C felony - no more than 7 years
Class A misdemeanor - no more than 1 year
Class B misdemeanor - no more than 30 days
Infractions - no prison term
23
Under the proposed code, the maximum penalties imposed would depend
upon the category of the offense. Accordingly, proponents argued that such
categorization would foster consistency of treatment for existing offenses,
and help in determining the most appropriate sentencing level for new of-
fenses. 24
Even if the Commission's recommendations are followed, the problem of
sentence inconsistency, although reduced, will still exist. Different generations
frequently hold divergent views as to the seriousness of specific offenses.
Thus, when enacting a new criminal law to deal with current problems, the
enacting Congress might believe the crime to be a Class B felony, whereas
a subsequent Congress would think that a Class A misdemeanor designation
was more appropriate. 25 Unfortunately, as these laws become antiquated,
there is little likelihood of repeal or amendment.
Based on the above reasoning, many of the problems prevalent in the
present criminal code will carry over to the new code. As Professor Wechsler
has stated, "the law that governs sentence and correction needs sustained and
critical attention."' 26 Therefore, although the Commission's recommendations
go far toward curing present deficiencies, more is needed. Congress should
consider establishing the National Commission on Reform of Federal Crimi-
nal Laws as a permanent body, whose sole function would be the periodic
review of the Code.
22. WORKING PAPERS at 1303.
23. PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3201.
24. WORKING PAPERS at 1259.
25. A good example is the federal narcotics law.
26. See Wechsler, note 14 supra at 493.
1971]
Catholic University Law Review
Disparity In Sentencing
Although the twentieth century has witnessed a remarkable trend toward
greater judicial discretion in sentencing, this has not always been so:
[T]he federal sentencing system started with the assumption that
the Congress should control sentencing and that no discretion
should be delegated either to the sentencing judge or a parole
board. 27
The trend toward greater judicial discretion did not continue unchallenged.
Critics charged that greater discretion would mean greater disparity and, in
turn, greater injustice. Their fears were best summarized by Professor
Glueck who noted that "the entrusting of undisciplined discretion [could]
lead, at worst, to tyrannical abuse of power and, at best, to erratic decisions. '' 28
Nevertheless, these critics represented the minority view. Proponents of
more flexibility within the sentencing system readily conceded the possibility
of greater disparity, but insisted that each individual case had its own peculiar
circumstances, and that different circumstances required different sentences.
Thus, the theory advanced was that
although . . .a burglary [was] always a burglary, not all burglars
[were] alike in the motivations of their crime, in their mental and
emotional makeup, social background, probability of recidivism
and such circumstances which [were] certainly every bit as relevant
to the aim of protecting society as [was] the crime itself, if not
more so. Such factors [made] each crime a unique event and each
criminal a unique individual.29
Today, there is a widespread belief that some degree of disparity is justifi-
able.80 For example, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice lists three justifications for such a belief:
(1) the need for variations based on relevant differences in of-
fenders;
(2) the fact that statutory definitions of crimes encompass a
a fairly broad range of conduct having varying degrees of seri-
ousness; and
(3) the effect of various geographical factors (e.g., differences in
public apprehension regarding crime, and the need to offer
more lenient sentences for defendants assisting public prose-
custors). 31
27. Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 257 (1960) (remarks of Judge
Campbell).
28. Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 FED. PROB. 15 (1956).
29. Id. at 16.
30. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs at 23.
31. Id.
[Vol. 20:748
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While penologists have been placing such emphasis on the individual, and
judges on the tailoring of their sentences to fit each particular case, 32 the
problem remains that two judges will rarely impose the same sentence even
though the circumstances are nearly identical. 33  Unfortunately, reducing
disparity significantly is a formidable, if not impossible task. As Congress-
man Celler noted, "[W]ith 248 federal district judges and 248 different
personalities, it is understandable that disparities should develop."' 34 That
the Congressman's remark was an understatement can be seen from the
following survey of average sentences imposed by a few selected federal
courts:
1) Narcotics Violations (1965)
83 months (10th Circuit)
44 months (3d Circuit)
2) Forgery (1962)
68 months (Northern District of Mississippi)
7 months (Southern District of Mississippi)
3) Auto Theft
47 months (Southern District of Iowa)
14 months (Northern District of New York) 35
It should be noted that disparity is not limited solely to prison terms. Pro-
bation has been used by some judges in less than 10 percent of their cases,
while others have utilized it up to 80 percent of the time.36
Finally, although judicial discretion is the greatest single cause of dispar-
ity, the absence of any flexibility in sentencing would lead to similar results.
No single statutory definition can encompass the "infinite variations in the
gravity of crimes."' 37 Nor can a statutory definition ever provide adequately
for the diverse character of individual offenders.38
Legislatively fixed sentences are as undesirable as unbridled judicial discre-
tion. Presumably, any reasonable solution lies between these two extremes.
The success of the National Commission depends basically on whether the
Commission has located and defined this point.
32. See Glueck, note 28 supra at 15-16.
33. See, e.g., Gaudet, Harris and St. John, Individual Differences in the Sentencing
Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 811 (1933). See also Everson, The
Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 90 (1919); Lane, Illogical Varia-
tions in Sentences of Felons Committed to Massachusetts State Prison, 32 J. GRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 171 (1941).
34. See note 15 supra at 242.
35. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURT at 23.
36. Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge, 40
F.R.D. 55, 56 (1966).
37. See Wechsler, supra note 14 at 478.
38. Id.
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Under The Proposed Code
At first glance, certain sections of the proposed code appear to enhance
rather than reduce disparity. For example, minimum sentences are clearly
discouraged under Section 3201(3) and allowed only for Class A and Class
B felonies, and then only in exceptional cases. 39  While it has been argued
that fixing lower minimums (or doing away with them completely) is
sound policy from the standpoint of flexibility within the courts, it cannot but
increase disparity since "variations formerly confined to maxima, will now
extend to minima as well." 40
Should Congress accept the proposed new code, prison terms would become
generally less severe then those existing today. One factor contributing to
this result would be the code's innovative provision for parole within every
prison sentence. Section 3201(2) states in part that:
[t]he maximum term of every indefinite sentence imposed by the
court shall include a prison component and a parole component.
The parole component of such maximum term shall be (i) one-
third for terms of nine years or less; (ii) three years for terms be-
tween nine and fifteen years, and (iii) five years for terms more
than fifteen years; and the prison component shall be the remainder
of such maximum term.41
The above provision represents a significant departure from current practice
since parole becomes an integral part of the sentence. Contrast this with
the present system under which a dangerous offender, serving all his term in
prison, would not be subject to parole whereas a rehabilitated or non-danger-
ous offender, released from prison early, would be subject to a lengthy parole
extending over the remaining period of his sentence.
As an example of why prison terms would be shorter under the proposed
code, consider the following illustration. Although a 30 year maximum
sentence would be authorized for commission of a Class A felony, the maxi-
mum time a criminal could be imprisoned would be 25 years, since maximum
terms under the proposed code include both a prison and a parole component
and the parole component for a Class A felony would probably be five
39. PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3201(3) states the following:
An indefinite sentence for a Class A or B felony shall have no minimum term
unless by the affirmative action of the court a term is set at no more than
one-third of the prison component actually imposed. No other indefinite
sentence shall have a minimum term. The court shall not impose a minimum
term unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a
term is required because of the exceptional features of the case. . ..
40. See Wechsler, supra note 14 at 479.
41. PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3201(2).
[Vol. 20:748
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years.4 2 Similarly, the only time a court could see a maximum term of
greater than 20 years for a Class A felony, 10 years for a Class B felony, or
5 years for a Class C felony, would be in the case of a "dangerous special of-
fender." Generally, the "dangerous special offender" category would include
persistent felony offenders; professional criminals or leaders of organized
crime; dangerous, mentally abnormal offenders; and offenders who used
firearms or other destructive device in the commission.4 3 Thus, most Class
A felons who appear to be liable for a maximum term of 30 years would at
most, barring some facts making him a danger to the community, subject
himself to a 20 year maximum term (15 years imprisonment and five years
parole). Note that all of the above mentioned terms are maximum terms
and in no way indicative of how much time the felon will actually spend in
prison. This is particularly significant since there are enormous differences
between sentences the system authorizes and sentences imposed by judges.
Furthermore, few felons actually serve their full sentences as originally im-
posed.44
Under section 3201(2), all prison sentences over six months would be in-
definite. Since judges and parole authorities would thereby retain signifi-
cant discretion in setting the length of sentences or the time of parole, the
problem of disparity in sentencing will remain a troublesome one even in the
event that Commission recommendations are accepted by Congress and en-
acted into law. The new code, however, would ease the problem somewhat
by setting forth various criteria which, "while not controlling the discretion of
the court, shall be accorded weight in making determinations. '4 Examples
of factors to be considered in determining what sentences should be accorded,
or at what time to grant parole, are found in Sections 3101, 3202, and 3402.
They include such factors as danger of further criminal activity, amount of
provocation, the desire for restitution to victims, past records, cooperation
with officials, and effect on institutional discipline.
Conclusion
The present federal criminal code is grossly inadequate. It is not structured
rationally, and is little more than a poorly organized compilation of existing
criminal statutes. The most promising aspect of the Commission's proposed
code is the attempt to integrate the various code sections into a rational
42. Id.
43. For a precise definition of "dangerous special offender" see PRoPosED NEw
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3202(2).
44. WORKING PAPERS at 1256.
45. PROPOSED NEw FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3101(3).
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scheme. 46  This is particularly important from the standpoint of sentencing
because a criminal offense considered serious enough by Congress to rate a
Class A or B felony designation, would automatically authorize the imposi-
tion of a Class A or B felony sentence. To this extent, sentences under the
proposed code would be more consistent than sentences under current meth-
ods. But as noted earlier, mores change and if the new code is to maximize
consistency in sentencing, the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws should become a permanent body whose function would be to
review the code periodically and make recommendations to Congress for its
modernization. Without such a body, or other provision for modernization,
the new code would once again become stagnant and inconsistent.
Under the Commission's proposed code, there would probably be some
some lessening of disparity in sentencing. In part, this would be accom-
plished by directing the attention of a judge to "those factors which the legis-
lature had determined to be relevant to the sentencing decision."'47
It appears that the only other successful method within the proposed code
for promoting parity in sentencing is the curtailment of long sentences which
necessarily leads to a greater limitation of the trial judge's discretion. This
is of limited value, however, due to the Commission's recommendation for
curtailment of minimum sentences.
Regardless of its shortcomings, the Commission's Report represents an
initial step that, if enacted by Congress, will result in sound reforms long
overdue.
Paul I. Sullivan
46. The Commission has borrowed substantially from other modem penal codes.
See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT (1963); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL
PENAL CODE (P.O.D. 1962); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Approved Draft, 1968).
47. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 17.
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